

Problems of a programmatic UBI debate within the German Party of Democratic Socialism

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While life without cares has been a major aspect of social utopian concepts of all times, the discussion about and call for an unconditioned basic income (UBI) has only risen during the last three decades. Concepts of this kind have been shaped and refined by smaller social, intellectual or religious groups, and have hardly ever found their way into mainstream politics.

The importance of extraparliamentary activities, such as campaigns, events, publications, for the promotion of UBI concepts is quite undisputed. The more difficult question is, what role political parties can or should play in this issue: After all, it would be up to them to introduce a Basic Income Law to parliament, or to vote on it.

So if we wish to promote UBI, NGO activities can only be the first step: it is vital to carry the discussion into the political parties, and to organize parliamentary majorities. This can be achieved through pressure from outside, but also through programmatic development within a party.

The discussion of UBI is well advanced among Austrian liberals and in the Catalanian Green party. In Germany it was an important issue of the newly founded Green party during the 80ies, while now there exists a considerable group among the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) who want to extend the party's concept of 'Soziale Grundsicherung' (a type of conditioned basic income) into a full-fledged UBI.

So far, UBI has been the subject of several papers, discussions, articles, etc. within the PDS; however, the claim for an UBI still has to make its way into the party programme. And there are reasons to doubt that such a claim would find a majority, because work is felt to be a moral obligation, and the main legitimation for receiving an income - even at a time when it is obvious that there is not enough paid work for all (and perhaps will never be again, given the development of productivity). The link between work and income has been a very strong one, particularly in the ending Fordistic era, irrespectice of whether the individual derives his/her moral principles from a religious, a neo-liberal or a socialist background.

For our context this means that even the PDS' existing concept of basic income is a matter of some dispute, in particular with regard to its importance to the party's aims and objectives in general. In the years since 1993 the party's concept of a conditioned basic income (CBI) has been subject to some changes. Basically, one can see the following tendency: While PDS parliamentarians have begun to develop concrete suggestions for a gradual introduction of a conditioned basic income, the focal point of the discussion within the party has long shifted, away from a basic income for those in need, to an UBI for everyone. However, as was stated before, currently such a claim is not capable of winning a majority. Noticeably, the sides of the debate coincide with the lines separating various camps and social groups within the party, and thus frequently overlap with personal conflicts as well.

The debate – often reduced to the right to be lazy vs. the right to work – acts as a catalyst for fundamentally different models of socialization, and can be rather fierce.

This leads to grotesque arguments, for instance when I as the author of a book on basic income am being accused by traditional marxists of corrupting the youth, while the same youth sometimes say that the traditionalists' resistance against a basic income would soon be overcome 'biologically'.

However, it cannot be my aim to carry internal conflicts of the PDS to the public in the form of anecdotes. Therefore I am going to present a quantitative empirical investigation. Admittedly, this investigation is not representative, and is only intended to illustrate trends.

One main group of informants were socially active PDS voters (most of them party members), whose answers will be compared with that of a control group. As dependent variables, attitudes towards the decoupling of work and income have been considered. These quantitative data will give an exemplary illustration of the chances and difficulties of successfully promoting UBI within the PDS.

It is likely that in a post communist party like the PDS, the conflict between a strong feeling of social responsibility and a conservative work ethics will bring out interesting insights into rationalization processes. These have to be dialectically taken into account in view of the EU extension, and the propagation of an UBI for the whole EU.

A first factor analysis of my data shows that there are two principal factors: Based on the content of the questions, I would call the first, including the Q 21,

22, 25, 27 and 30, the "tough line factor", the second, including the Q 17, 19, 26, 29 and 31, the "compassion factor".

Starting from these factors and adding to them the doubtlessly correlated Q 15, 16 and 24 which are especially important for our purpose, we find the correlations as shown in table 1. We consider only correlations higher than ,300.

It is obvious that the main Q 15 is negatively correlated to all questions of factor 1 ("tough line"), except to Q 22. Probably scepticism concerning a UBI is not very strong among people who consider the GDR a socially better system, although we would have predicted otherwise, because of the socialist working-ethics. It does not surprise, however, that those who want a UBI want also a party who struggles for it.

Q 16 – a "control-question" related to question 15 – does not show any interesting correlations at all, except a slight one to Q 21. This is no surprise: people who believe in neoclassic economics generally do not like a UBI but prefer a social security system for individuals who show a certain symptom (if they see the necessity for a social security system at all).

Q 17 is related to the "egalitarian" answers to Q 22 and Q 31 as well as to the "archaic" christian-communist answers to Q 19 and the optimist neoliberal answers to Q 21.

Q 18 is perhaps the "strongest" question: people could out themselves as rightwing supporters of capitalism. And in fact there are high correlations to antisocialist answers to Q 25, anti-UBI-answers to Q 27 and the answers supporting a right-wing social policy in Q 30. There are also correlations to the neoclassic answers to Q 21 and the conservative ones to Q 29 and Q 31. Of course, there is a significant negative correlation to Q 15: people who think that there exists an excessive abuse of social systems generally tend to be against a UBI; surprisingly the same people seem to have nothing against a UBI-party (Q 24).

The correlations of Q 19 show that among informants who see an affinity between the Christian Faith and socialism, there is an obvious affinity to the social system of the GDR, too. Of course, these people want socialists and Christians to struggle together (Q 26), maybe by supporting a UBI-party (Q 24).

No surprise again that people who think that there is no alternative to neoliberal policies (Q 20) show an agreement to the positions of this policy (Q 21, Q 27, Q

30), hoping that this policy will provide work to everybody (Q 31) and denying the charming possibility of a UBI (Q 15).

The same could be said concerning Q 21. But the correlations with Q 16 and Q 17 show doubtlessly that even socially aware (but maybe conservative) people believe in neoliberal ideology, as presented in fact in Q 21.

The interesting results concerning the relation between those who prefer the GDR's social system and those who see an important affinity between Christian religion and communism have been shown already. The amazing fact is again that these GDR-nostalgics seem to be quite open to the idea of a UBI.

In Q 23 there have been many missing answers, because many people do not seem to know the "Sermon on the Mount". Anyway, it can be expected that in general – if known at all – it is positively connotated as a possible peaceful Utopia; no surprise about the negative correlation to Q 25, concerning a (potentially positive) socialist Utopia.

In democratic societies people seem to be quite open to accept that there are parties who struggle for other interests than they have themselves: not only GDR-nostalgics (Q 22) are open-minded concerning a UBI-party (Q 24) but also antisocialists (Q 25); religious socialists would like to have such a party (Q 19, Q 26) and of course the supporters of a UBI (Q 15).

It is not surprising at all that GDR-nostalgics (Q 22) are more optimist concerning the possibility of a socialist society (Q 25) than supporters of neoliberalism. Interesting again the affinity between the agreement with a socialist future on one side and the agreement with UBI on the other (Q 27, Q 15), by rejecting neoliberal positions (Q 30, Q 29).

Table 1: Correlations between questions.

Nr. Of question	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Factor 1											
21	-,372	,321	,317	,382		,333	1,000				,376
22	,329		,391		,499			1,000		,387	-,359
25	-, 588			, 588			,376	-,359	-,359	,497	1,000
27	-, 522			, 573		,304	,376			-,371	, 532
30	-,420			, 589		,375	,376				,499
Factor 2											
17			1,000		,361		,317	,391			
19			,361		1,000			,499		,454	
26					,419			,314		,305	

29				,379			,304				,341
31			,317	,308		,327					
UBI- Questions											
15	1,000			-,510		-,365		,329		,657	-,588
16		1,000					,321				
24	,657			,337	,454			,387		1,000	,497

Nr. Of question	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
Factor 1							
21		,376		,304	,376		
22	,314						
25		,532		,341	,499		,396
27		1,000		,406	,478		,525
30		,478		,353	1,000		,501
Factor 2							
17						,317	
19	,419						
26	1,000						
29		,406		1,000	,353		,419
31						1,000	
UBI- Questions							
15		-,522			-,420		-,452
16							
24	,305	-,371	,334				-,331

Q 26 does not show new insights, neither do Q 27, Q 28, Q 29, Q 30, Q 31 and Q 32. The data show that among the people who were interviewed, there is a high affinity between left-wing positions and the idea of a UBI. No doubt that this is a consequence of the choice of informants itself. Therefore it seems to be important to have a look on social data of the people interviewed (table 2-10).

First (tab. 2), we can see that there are many employed people in the sample and only a few unemployed; most people are well qualified (tab. 3). The majority live in big towns like Leipzig or Berlin but there is still an important number of people of more rural background (tab. 4). In table 5 we can see that the voters of other parties than the PDS can form together a contrast-group; as single variables they cannot play a role in a statistic analysis. The same can be said about socially active and inactive people (tab. 6). Concerning the origin of the people, most are from Saxony (tab. 7). For the other people, I propose to deal

with three groups: people from Berlin, from the “Eastern” Lander and from the “Western” ones. In tabel 8 we can have a look at the faith of the informants: most of them seem to be agnostics or atheists; therefore it could make sense sometimes to put protestants and catholics together in one category. The remaining two tables show (tab. 9, tab. 10) that we have a rather heterogenous population.

Table 2: Occupation of informants

	Frequency	Percent
Pensioners	11	11,1
Students	21	21,2
Employed people	53	53,5
Unemployed	9	9,1
Others	5	5,1
All	99	100
No answer	1	

Table 3: Education of the informants

Years of education / professional training	Frequency	Percent
To 10	3	3,2
11-15	34	36,6
16-20	46	49,5
More than 20	10	10,8
All	93	100
No answers	7	

Table 4: Home town size of informants

Category of Location	Frequency	Percent
Village	16	16
Small town (less than 20.000 inhabitants)	8	8
Middle town (20.001-100.000 inhabitants)	13	13
Big town (more than 100.000 inhabitants)	63	63
All	100	100
No answers	0	

Table 5: Political orientation of informants

Party	Frequency	Percent
CDU (Christian Democrats)	5	5,5
SPD (Social Democrats)	11	12,1
Greens	15	16,5
Others	8	8,8
Sum (Centre-Parties)	39	42,9
PDS (Democratic Socialists)	52	57,1
All	91	100
No answers	12	

Table 6: Informants' grade of social activity

Activity in an association or party	Frequency	Percent
No	39	39
Leading	11	11
Middle	17	17
Basic	25	25
More than one answer	8	8
All actives	61	61
All	100	100
No answers	0	

Table 7: Informants' lander of origin

Land	Frequency	Percent
Saxony	62	62
Thuringia	5	5
Brandenburg	2	2
Saxony-Anhalt	2	2
Mecklenburg - Anterior Pommerania	1	1
"East" excl. Saxony	10	10
Berlin	11	11
Baden-Württemberg	9	9
Hassia	6	6
Northrhine-Westphalia	2	2
"West"	17	17
All	100	100
No answers	0	

Table 8: Informants' religious denomination

Religious denomination	Frequency	Percent
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Protestant	16	16,2
Catholic	13	13,1
Christians	29	29,3
Without denomination	67	67,7
Others	3	3,0
All	99	100
No answers	1	

Table 9: Informants' number of children

Number of children	Frequency	Percent
0	57	57
1	19	19
2	13	13
1-2	32	32
3	6	6
More than 3	5	5
More than 2	11	11
All	100	100
No answers	0	

Table 10: Age of informants

Years	Frequency	Percent
1-30	32	32,7
31-60	54	55,1
More than 60	12	12,2
All	98	100
No answers	2	

After this introduction to the population as a whole we should have a look on certain questions. We should concentrate on Q 25 and Q 27 for factor 1 and Q 17 for factor 2; after that, of course, we will examine the core-questions Q 15, Q 16 and Q 24.

Table 11: Q 25 by occupation

	Pensioners	Students	Employed	Unemployed	Others
1 "fully agree"	20,0%	18,8%	16,7%	12,5%	20,0%
2 "mostly agree"	0,0%	25,0%	10,4%	0,0%	0,0%
1+2	20,0%	43,8%	27,1%	12,5%	20,0%
3 "mostly disagree"	30,0%	25,0%	47,9%	50,0%	60,0%
4 "fully disagree"	50,0%	31,3%	25,0%	37,5%	20,0%

3+4	80,0%	56,3%	72,9%	87,5%	80,0%
All	100,0%	100,1%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 11 shows that scepticism concerning the possibility of a socialist society is significantly higher among students than among the other groups; more than all, unemployed people seem to believe in the possibility of socialism. We can see (tab. 12) that there is a certain relationship between education and scepticism regarding the possibility of socialism; however, the differences between the groups are not as strong as seen in tab. 11. We can therefore predict that there is a group with a combination of high education and low age (students in fact), as shown in tab. 11 and confirmed in tab. 13, who are not very open minded concerning a socialist future.

Table 12: Q 25 by education

	To 10	11-15	To 15	16-20	More than 20	More than 15
1 "fully agree"	33,3%	16,1%	16,1%	16,3%	11,1%	30,0%
2 "mostly agree"	0,0%	9,7%	6,5%	9,3%	0,0%	0,0%
1+2	33,3%	25,8%	22,6%	25,6%	11,1%	30,0%
3 "mostly disagree"	0,0%	41,9%	35,5%	44,2%	55,6%	60,0%
4 "fully disagree"	66,7%	32,3%	41,9%	30,2%	33,3%	10,0%
3+4	66,7%	74,2%	77,4%	74,4%	88,9%	70,0%
All	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 13: Q 25 by age

Number of years	1-30	31-60	More than 60
1 "fully agree"	13,8%	16,3%	25,0%
2 "mostly agree"	24,1%	6,1%	0,0%
1+2	37,9%	22,4%	25,3%
3 "mostly disagree"	31,3%	51,0%	33,3%
4 "fully disagree"	31,3%	26,5%	41,7%
3+4	62,1%	77,5%	74,9%
All	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 14: Q 25 by lander of origin

Lander of origin	Saxony	Berlin	East	West
1 "fully agree"	10,3%	20,0%	33,3%	26,7%
2 "mostly agree"	5,2%	10,0%	11,1%	33,3%
1+2	15,5%	30,0%	44,4%	60,0%
3 "mostly disagree"	44,8%	60,0%	22,2%	33,3%

4 "fully disagree"	39,7%	10,0%	33,3%	6,7%
3+4	84,5%	70,0%	55,5%	40,0%
All	100,0%	100,0%	99,9%	100,0%

Table 15: Q 25 by size of hometown

Type of location	village	Small town	Village or small town	Middle town	Big town	Middle or big town
1 "fully agree"	25,0%	12,5%	20,8%	23,1%	12,7%	14,7%
2 "mostly agree"	6,3%	12,5%	8,3%	0,0%	14,6%	11,8%
1+2	31,3%	25,0%	29,1%	23,1%	27,3%	26,5%
3 "mostly disagree"	37,5%	62,5%	45,8%	38,5%	41,8%	41,2%
4 "fully disagree"	31,3%	12,5%	25,0%	38,5%	30,9%	32,4%
3+4	68,8%	75,0%	70,8%	77,0%	72,7%	73,6%
All	100,1%	100,0%	99,9%	100,1%	100,0%	100,1%

As Saxonians seem to be the most optimist (or pessimist) concerning a socialist future, people from Western Germany (sharing an anticommunist official tradition) have more doubts about (tab. 14). The comparison between rural and urban population (tab. 15) does not really bring us to new insights. Even more this can be said about the category "number of children", so that I do not even present a table. More evidence we can find in data concerning the social activities (tab. 16), political orientation (tab. 16) and also the religious denomination (tab. 17) of the informants. Integrated to a high degree in the capitalist society, Christians tend to prefer a sort of "social free enterprise" to socialism or communism. This is also due to the fact that many Christians remember being harrassed by GDR authorities.

Table 16: Q 25 by social activities and political preference:

Political preference / social activities	Center Parties	PDS	No association or party member	Association or party member
1 "fully agree"	24,3%	8,0%	25,0%	10,7%
2 "mostly agree"	18,9%	4,0%	25,0%	1,8%
1+2	43,2%	12,0%	50,0%	12,5%
3 "mostly disagree"	45,9%	40,0%	47,2%	39,3%
4 "fully disagree"	10,8%	48,0%	2,8%	48,2%
3+4	56,7%	88,0%	50,0%	87,5%
All	99,9%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 17: Q 25 by religious denomination

Religious denomination	Protestant	Catholic	Christians together	Without denomination
1 "fully agree"	15,4%	18,2%	16,7%	14,1%
2 "mostly agree"	23,1%	27,3%	25,0%	6,3%
1+2	38,5%	45,5%	41,7%	20,4%
3 "mostly disagree"	38,5%	45,5%	41,7%	42,2%
4 "fully disagree"	23,1%	9,1%	16,7%	37,5%
3+4	61,6%	54,6%	58,4%	79,7%
All	100,1%	100,1%	100,1%	100,1%

It is really not surprising that socialists trust in a socialist future more than non-socialists. It seems, however, that there is a high correlation between socially active people and socialists, maybe due to the fact that there are many party-members among the socially active. Therefore we have to look further on (tab. 18) and "separate" party-members from other social active people:

Table 18: Q 25 by social/political activity

Type of activity	PDS-supporter and member of party/ association	No PDS-supporter but member of party/ association	Neither PDS-supporter nor member of party/ association
1 "fully agree"	6,8%	25,0%	25,0%
2 "mostly agree"	0,0%	8,3%	25,0%
1+2	6,8%	33,3%	50,0%
3 "mostly disagree"	36,4%	50,0%	47,2%
4 "fully disagree"	56,8%	16,7%	2,8%
3+4	93,2%	66,7%	50,0%
All	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 18 shows very evidently what we already know: socialists believe in a socialist future. But it shows also that even non-socialist people who are socially active are much more ready to imagine a socialist future than inactive people. Probably they use their social activities also to create a better society. This is a traditional left-wing attitude. Therefore a socialist party should try to convince socially active multipliers. The overview on Q 25 has been important because we are dealing with a socialist party. The examination of Q 27 will provide us more insights about the question if for such a party it would be useful to promote a UBI.

Table 19: Q 27 by occupation

	Pensioners	Students	Employed	Unemployed	Others
1 "fully agree"	20,0%	19,0%	13,5%	11,1%	0,0%
2 "mostly agree"	0,0%	38,1%	15,4%	11,1%	20,0%
1+2	20,0%	57,1%	28,9%	22,2%	20,0%
3 "mostly disagree"	40,0%	33,3%	36,5%	44,4%	40,0%
4 "fully disagree"	40,0%	9,5%	34,6%	33,3%	40,0%
3+4	80,0%	42,8%	71,1%	77,7%	80,0%
All	100,0%	99,9%	100,0%	99,9%	100,0%

Table 19 shows that scepticism concerning the willingness to work under UBI-conditions is significantly higher among students than among the other groups. We can see (tab. 20) that there is practically no relationship between education and confirmations of Q 27. We could therefore predict that the group of young people does not trust in the persistence of the work ethos under UBI-conditions, either. Table 21 shows the contrary: the older the informants are, the more they believe that nobody would work if s/he gets an UBI. It is of course not clear if older people behave like this, because they think people are lazy humble (being content with only the UBI), or if we have to presume that the different generations define 'work' differently.

Table 20: Q 27 by education

	To 10	11-15	To 15	16-20	More than 20	More than 15
1 "fully agree"	0,0%	15,2%	13,9%	8,7%	22,2%	10,9%
2 "mostly agree"	33,3%	15,2%	16,7%	21,7%	0,0%	18,2%
1+2	33,3%	30,2%	30,6%	30,4%	22,2%	29,1%
3 "mostly disagree"	33,3%	27,3%	27,8%	43,5%	55,6%	45,5%
4 "fully disagree"	33,3%	42,4%	41,7%	26,1%	22,2%	25,5%
3+4	66,6%	69,7%	69,5%	69,6%	77,8%	71,0%
All	99,9%	99,9%	100,1%	100,0%	100,0%	100,1%

Table 21: Q 27 by age

Number of years	1-30	31-60	More than 60
1 "fully agree"	3,1%	29,4%	63,6%
2 "mostly agree"	34,3%	21,6%	18,2%
1+2	37,3%	51,0%	81,8%
3 "mostly disagree"	38,7%	39,2%	18,2%
4 "fully disagree"	25,0%	9,8%	0,0%
3+4	63,7%	49,0%	18,2%
All	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

What we can see in tab. 22 is that informants from Saxony do not behave in the way other people in Eastern Germany do. Maybe this is a consequence of the UBI-discussions by parts of the Saxonian PDS.

Table 22: Q 27 by lander of origin

Lander of origin	Saxony	Berlin	East	West
1 "fully agree"	14,8%	10,0%	30,0%	5,9%
2 "mostly agree"	8,2%	10,0%	20,0%	58,8%
1+2	23,0%	20,0%	50,0%	64,7%
3 "mostly disagree"	45,9%	50,0%	20,0%	11,8%
4 "fully disagree"	31,2%	30,0%	30,0%	23,5%
3+4	77,1%	80,0%	50,0%	35,3%
All	100,1%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Therefore, it seems to be useful to have first a look at political preferences (tab. 23, 24) and after concretely at the Saxonian PDS (tab. 25). It becomes clear that PDS votes' attitudes to UBI differ strongly from those of other informants, especially in Saxony (even if Saxonian PDS-voters are heterogeneous as well!). Maybe this is a consequence of positive UBI-propaganda within the Saxonian PDS. Another interesting outcome of table 24 is that there is no difference between people who are members of associations and those who are not (this has been different regarding Q 25).

Table 23: Q 27 by social activities and political preference:

	Center Parties	PDS	No association or party member	Association or party member
1 "fully agree"	15,8%	9,8%	20,5%	10,2%
2 "mostly agree"	36,8%	5,9%	28,2%	11,9%
1+2	52,6%	15,7%	48,7%	22,0%
3 "mostly disagree"	34,2%	47,1%	30,8%	42,4%
4 "fully disagree"	13,2%	37,3%	20,5%	35,6%
3+4	47,4%	84,4%	51,3%	78,0%
All	100,0%	100,1%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 24: Q 27 by social/political activity

Type of activity	PDS-supporter and member of party/ association	No PDS-supporter but member of party/ Association	Neither PDS-supporter nor member of party/ association
1 "fully agree"	11,4%	6,7%	20,5%

2 "mostly agree"	2,3%	40,0%	28,2%
1+2	13,7%	46,7%	48,7%
3 "mostly disagree"	47,7%	26,7%	30,8%
4 "fully disagree"	38,6%	26,7%	20,5%
3+4	86,3%	53,4%	51,3%
All	100,0%	100,1%	100,0%

Table 25: Q 27 by PDS-voters

	No PDS-voters	Saxonian PDS-voters	Other PDS-voters
1 "fully agree"	19,2%	11,6%	0,0%
2 "mostly agree"	31,9%	2,3%	25,0%
1+2	51,1%	13,9%	25,0%
3 "mostly disagree"	27,7%	51,2%	25,0%
4 "fully disagree"	21,3%	34,9%	50,0%
3+4	49,0%	86,1%	75,0%
All	100,1%	100,0%	100,0%

Other factors as size of hometown or number of children do not play any significant role concerning Q 27. It seems that only religious denomination has an influence on the attitudes regarding UBI, as elicited in Q 27. As shown in table 26, protestants fear more than people without confession that people would not like to work if getting UBI. This can be a reflexion of protestant ethics of work and calling, as described by May Weber. Surprisingly, those who fear this far more than everybody else are catholics!

Table 26: Q 27 by religious denomination

Religious denomination	Protestant	Catholic	Christians together	Without denomination
1 "fully agree"	12,5%	25,0%	17,9%	12,1%
2 "mostly agree"	25,0%	41,7%	32,1%	10,6%
1+2	37,5%	66,7%	50,0%	22,7%
3 "mostly disagree"	37,5%	25,1%	32,1%	40,9%
4 "fully disagree"	25,0%	8,3%	17,9%	36,4%
3+4	62,5%	33,3%	50,0%	77,3%
All	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Q 17 is practically the positive version of Q 27, therefore part of the generally more "compassioned" factor 2. As demonstrated by tables 27-29, the typical

person who thinks that first everybody should get enough to live before some may live in luxury, is rather old, retired and has no academic education.

Table 27: Q 17 by occupation

	Pensioners	Students	Employed	Unemployed	Others
1 "fully agree"	54,6%	23,8%	17,3%	66,7%	40,0%
2 "mostly agree"	27,3%	19,1%	30,8%	0,0%	60,0%
1+2	81,9%	42,9%	48,1%	66,7%	100,0%
3 "mostly disagree"	9,1%	33,3%	28,9%	11,1%	0,0%
4 "fully disagree"	9,1%	23,8%	23,1%	22,2%	0,0%
3+4	18,2%	57,1%	52,0%	33,3%	0,0%
All	100,1%	100,0%	100,1%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 28: Q 17 by age

Number of years	1-30	31-60	More than 60
1 "fully agree"	31,3%	20,8%	58,3%
2 "mostly agree"	18,8%	30,2%	25,0%
1+2	50,1%	51,0%	83,3%
3 "mostly disagree"	21,9%	30,2%	8,3%
4 "fully disagree"	28,1%	18,9%	8,3%
3+4	50,0%	49,1%	16,6%
All	100,1%	100,1%	99,9%

Table 29: Q 17 by education

	To 10	11-15	To 15	16-20	More than 20	More than 15
1 "fully agree"	66,7%	38,2%	40,5%	20,0%	30,0%	21,8%
2 "mostly agree"	0,0%	35,3%	32,4%	31,1%	10,0%	27,3%
1+2	66,7%	73,5%	72,9%	51,1%	40,0%	49,1%
3 "mostly disagree"	0,0%	17,7%	16,2%	24,4%	30,0%	25,5%
4 "fully disagree"	33,3%	8,8%	10,8%	24,4%	30,0%	25,5%
3+4	33,3%	26,5%	27,0%	48,8%	60,0%	51,0%
All	100,0%	100,0%	99,9%	99,9%	100,0%	100,1%

This person lives in Eastern Germany, is atheist or protestant, rather than catholic, and has children (tab. 30-32) and probably votes PDS (tab. 33).

Table 30: Q 17 by lander of origin

Lander of origin	Saxony	Berlin	East	West
1 "fully agree"	34,4%	27,3%	10,0%	17,7%
2 "mostly agree"	16,4%	45,5%	70,0%	29,4%

1+2	50,8%	72,8%	80,0%	47,1%
3 "mostly disagree"	31,2%	0,0%	20,0%	17,7%
4 "fully disagree"	18,0%	27,3%	0,0%	35,3%
3+4	49,2%	27,3%	20,0%	53,0%
All	100,0%	100,1%	100,0%	100,1

Table 31: Q 17 by religious denomination

Religious denomination	Protestant	Catholic	Christians together	Without denomination
1 "fully agree"	31,3%	15,4%	24,1%	28,8%
2 "mostly agree"	31,3%	23,1%	27,6%	28,8%
1+2	62,6%	38,5%	51,7%	57,6%
3 "mostly disagree"	12,5%	23,1%	17,2%	27,3%
4 "fully disagree"	25,0%	38,5%	31,0%	15,2%
3+4	37,5%	61,6%	48,2%	42,5%
All	100,1%	100,1%	99,9%	100,1%

Table 32: Q 17 by number of children

Number of children	No children	1 child	2 children	1-2	3 children	+ 3	More than 2
1 "fully agree"	26,8%	21,1%	30,8%	25,0%	50,0%	40,0%	45,5%
2 "mostly agree"	21,4%	47,4%	30,8%	40,6%	0,0%	40,0%	18,2%
1+2	48,2%	68,5%	61,6%	65,6%	50,0%	80,0%	63,7%
3 "mostly disagree"	28,6%	10,5%	30,8%	18,8%	33,3%	0,0%	18,2%
4 "fully disagree"	23,2%	21,1%	7,7%	15,6%	16,7%	20,0%	18,2%
3+4	51,8%	31,6%	38,5%	34,4%	50,0%	20,0%	36,4%
All	100,0%	100,1%	100,1%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,1%

Summarizing table 32, 48,2% of the people without children answer Q 17 in a positive way, 51,8% in a negative one, while 65,1% of the people with children answer in a positive way and only 34,9% in a negative one. This shows that there is a trend for people with children – starting from their own socio-economic situation – towards a more egalitarian view on society than singles or "dinks" do.

Table 33: Q 17 by political preferences

Preferred party	CDU	SPD	Greens	Others	"Center"	PDS
1 "fully agree"	20,0	0,0	20,0%	37,5%	17,9%	39,2%
2 "mostly agree"	0,0	45,5%	33,3%	0,0%	25,6%	27,5%
1+2	20,0	45,5%	53,3%	37,5%	43,5%	66,7%
3 "mostly disagree"	80,0	9,1%	13,3%	62,5%	30,8%	21,6%

4 "fully disagree"	0,0	45,5%	33,3%	0,0%	25,6%	11,8%
3+4	80,0	54,6%	46,6%	62,5%	56,4%	33,4%
All	100,0	100,1%	99,9%	100,0%	99,9%	100,1%

The most "egalitarian" view have, however, those who vote for the PDS, followed by Greens. The "extreme" values concerning the Christians Democrats do correspond in a certain way with our data concerning catholics; they do not correspond with the respective data regarding protestants (tab. 31). Other independent factors influencing the answers to Q 17 are a PDS-membership and – to some extent – the difference between rural and urban society: PDS-members and people from the countryside have a more egalitarian view on society than urban population and not-PDS-members have. This is only a slight tendency and I do not find it necessary to present tables regarding these data. However, it is an interesting fact, because in the countryside PDS gets significantly less votes than in urban regions.

Looking at Q 17, we have seen data concerning an egalitarian view on society. An UBI is, on a low economic level, a concrete instrument to put the theoretical claim of Q 17 into practice. This is why I previously called Q 17 the positive counterpart of Q 27. After having seen the precedent data it will be interesting to find out, if the "more egalitarian" PDS-supporters, people from Eastern Germany and also older people will also accept the idea of an UBI which does not fit into any protestant, capitalist or socialist ideology of work. For whom an UBI will be especially interesting? I will contrast the answers to Q 15 to the answers to Q 16, because Q 16 is a kind of "control question" for Q 15, they exclude each other. The following tables show (tab. 34 - tab. 39) – especially tab. 38 and tab. 39 – that this exclusion, however, has been accepted only by part of the population. Many of the informants might have thought that a CBI is better than no BI at all. Others may be against any BI at all, even for the needy.

Let us go in detail now (tab. 34 and tab. 35): Pensioners seem to accept both an UBI and a CBI, students behave very heterogeneously, employed people slightly prefer an UBI. Pensioners and students, on the other hand, prefer slightly a CBI. The situation seems to be clear only for the unemployed. Even if they would profit also by a CBI, they prefer a UBI, perhaps because they are better informed about alternatives to the existing social security systems than other people are. Another – more psychologic – explanation would be that they do not want to

enjoy a privilege, but rather receive the same payment as everybody else does, as a human right.

The data show furthermore (tab. 36 and tab. 37) that an UBI cannot be called the idea of only young people. Rather, the contrary is true: a CBI is far more accepted by older people than by younger, and even an UBI gets more approval among older informants.

The higher values for an UBI than for a CBI in tab. 38 and tab. 39 are an expression of "double agreements" by informants who did not accept or realize the mutually exclusive character of Q 15 and Q 16.

Table 34: Q 15 by occupation

	Pensioners	Students	Employed	Unemployed	Others
1 "fully agree"	70,0%	30,0%	26,4%	85,7%	60,0%
2 "mostly agree"	10,0%	10,0%	30,2%	14,3%	20,0%
1+2	80,0%	40,0%	56,6%	100,0%	80,0%
3 "mostly disagree"	20,0%	30,0%	32,1%	0,0%	0,0%
4 "fully disagree"	0,0%	30,0%	11,3%	0,0%	20,0%
3+4	20,0%	60,0%	43,4%	0,0%	20,0%
All	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 35: Q 16 by occupation

	Pensioners	Students	Employed	Unemployed	Others
1 "fully agree"	55,6%	4,8%	26,4%	25,0%	20,0%
2 "mostly agree"	33,3%	47,6%	22,6%	0,0%	0,0%
1+2	88,9%	52,4%	49,1%	25,0%	20,0%
3 "mostly disagree"	11,1%	28,6%	39,6%	50,0%	60,0%
4 "fully disagree"	0,0%	19,1%	11,3%	25,0%	20,0%
3+4	11,1%	47,7%	50,9%	75,0%	80,0%
All	100,0%	100,1%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 36: Q 15 by age

Number of years	1-30	31-60	More than 60
1 "fully agree"	35,5%	34,6%	54,6%
2 "mostly agree"	16,1%	28,9%	9,1%
1+2	51,6%	63,5%	63,6%
3 "mostly disagree"	22,6%	26,9%	36,4%
4 "fully disagree"	25,8%	9,6%	0,0%
3+4	48,4%	36,5%	36,4%
All	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 37: Q 16 by age

Number of years	1-30	31-60	More than 60
1 "fully agree"	28,6%	46,0%	83,3%
2 "mostly agree"	28,6%	40,0%	16,7%
1+2	57,2%	86,0%	100,0%
3 "mostly disagree"	14,3%	4,0%	0,0%
4 "fully disagree"	28,6%	10,0%	0,0%
3+4	42,9%	14,0%	0,0%
All	100,1%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 38: Q 15 by education

	To 10	11-15	To 15	16-20	More than 20	More than 15
1 "fully agree"	100,0%	47,1%	51,4%	31,8	37,5%	32,7%
2 "mostly agree"	0,0%	14,7%	13,5%	31,8%	12,5%	28,9%
1+2	100,0%	61,8%	64,9%	63,6%	50,0%	61,6%
3 "mostly disagree"	0,0%	29,4%	27,0%	22,7%	37,5%	25,0%
4 "fully disagree"	0,0%	8,8%	8,1%	13,6%	12,5%	13,5%
3+4	0,0%	38,2%	35,1%	36,3%	50,0%	38,5%
All	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%	99,9%	100,0%	100,1%

Table 39: Q 16 by education

	To 10	11-15	To 15	16-20	More than 20	More than 15
1 "fully agree"	0,0%	28,1%	25,7%	22,7%	40,0%	25,9%
2 "mostly agree"	0,0%	25,0%	22,9%	22,7%	20,0%	22,2%
1+2	0,0%	53,1%	48,6%	45,4%	60,0%	48,1%
3 "mostly disagree"	66,7%	37,5%	40,0%	40,9%	20,0%	37,0%
4 "fully disagree"	33,3%	9,4%	11,4%	13,6%	20,0%	14,8%
3+4	100,0%	46,9%	51,4%	54,5%	40,0%	51,8%
All	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	99,9%	100,0%	99,9%

People with an urban background generally are more open for an UBI (63,4%) than rural people and inhabitants of small towns (50%), while there is no significant difference between people with and without children. (No table)

Table 40: Q 15 / Q 16 by religious denomination

Religious denomination	Protestant	Catholic	Christians together	Without denomination
1 "fully agree"	25,0%/ 26,7%	0,0%/ 23,1%	14,3%/ 25,0%	48,4%/ 25,0%
2 "mostly agree"	31,3%/ 33,3%	33,3%/ 46,2%	32,1%/ 39,3%	18,8%/ 18,8%
1+2	56,3%/ 60,0%	33,3%/ 69,3%	46,4%/ 64,3%	67,2%/ 43,8%

3 "mostly disagree"	25,0%/ 40,0%	33,3%/ 23,1%	28,6%/ 32,1%	25,0%/ 39,1%
4 "fully disagree"	18,8%/ 0,0%	33,3%/ 7,7%	25,0%/ 3,6%	7,8%/ 17,2%
3+4	43,8%/ 40,0%	66,6%/ 30,8%	53,6%/ 35,7%	32,8%/ 56,3%
All	100,0%/ 100,0%	99,9% / 100,1%	100,0%/ 100,0%	100,0%/ 100,1%

There is one big catholic association in Germany, the Catholic Workers Movement (KAB) which has been struggling for a kind of UBI for several years. Nevertheless it seems (tab. 40) that only catholic people are far more convinced by a CBI than by an UBI, a tendency hardly noticeable among protestants. Unreligious people prefer an UBI. This cannot be explained just by ideologic or dogmatic reasons, because the validity of ethics generally endures even when faith is on its end.

Table 41: Q 15 / Q 16 by lander of origin

Lander of origin	Saxony	Berlin	East	West
1 "fully agree"	52,5%/ 16,9%	18,2%/ 60,0%	20,0%/ 40,0%	12,5%/ 17,7%
2 "mostly agree"	22,0%/ 15,3%	27,3%/ 30,0%	10,0%/ 50,0%	25,0%/ 41,2%
1+2	74,5%/ 32,2%	45,5%/ 90,0%	30,0%/ 90,0%	37,5%/ 58,9%
3 "mostly disagree"	18,6%/ 47,5%	36,4%/ 10,0%	50,0%/ 10,0%	31,3%/ 35,3%
4 "fully disagree"	6,8%/ 20,3%	18,2%/ 0,0%	20,0%/ 0,0%	31,3%/ 5,9%
3+4	25,4%/ 67,8%	54,6%/ 10,0%	70,0%/ 10,0%	62,6%/ 41,2%
All	99,9%/ 100,0%	100,1%/ 100,0%	100,0%/ 100,0%	100,1%/ 100,1%

Table 41 shows that Saxonian informants - and informants in Eastern Germany generally - have been more aware of the mutually exclusive character of Q 15 and Q 16 than others. Only in Saxonia, however, UBI gets a majority, everywhere else people prefer a CBI. Tab. 42 suggests that this is due to those informants that are Saxonian PDS members. Tab. 43 and tab. 44 show that the ideal UBI-supporter in my population is member (or at least voter) of the Saxonian PDS. All other groups (PDS outside Saxonia, members of other associations, voter of other parties) prefer a CBI, even if the values in favour of an UBI are not too low, either.

Table 42: Q 15 / Q 16 by social activities and political preference:

	Center Parties	PDS	No association or party member	Association or party member
1 "fully agree"	13,5%/ 26,3%	62,0%/ 22,0%	21,6%/ 27,8%	49,2%/ 21,7%
2 "mostly agree"	24,3%/ 39,5%	18,0%/ 14,0%	29,7%/ 41,7%	16,9%/ 15,0%
1+2	37,8%/ 65,8%	80,0%/ 36,0%	51,3%/ 69,5%	66,1%/ 36,7%

3 "mostly disagree"	35,1%/28,9%	18,0%/46,0%	24,3%/22,2%	27,1%/46,7%
4 "fully disagree"	27,0%/5,3%	2,0%/18,0%	24,3%/8,3%	6,8%/16,7%
3+4	62,1%/34,2%	20,0%/64,0%	48,6%/30,5%	33,9%/63,4%
All	99,9%/100,0%	100,0%/100,0%	99,9%/100,0%	100,0%/100,1%

Table 43: Q 15 / 16 by social/political activity

Type of activity	PDS-supporter and member of party/ association	No PDS-supporter but member of party/ Association	Neither PDS-supporter nor member of party/ Association
1 "fully agree"	65,1%/22,7%	6,3%/18,8%	21,6%/27,8%
2 "mostly agree"	16,3%/9,1%	18,8%/31,3%	29,7%/41,7%
1+2	81,4%/31,8%	25,1%/50,1%	51,3%/69,5%
3 "mostly disagree"	18,6%/50,0%	50,0%/37,5%	24,3%/22,2%
4 "fully disagree"	0,0%/18,2%	25,0%/12,5%	24,3%/8,3%
3+4	18,6%/68,2%	75,0%/50,0%	48,6%/30,5%
All	100,0%/100,0%	100,1%/100,1%	99,9%/100,0%

Table 44: Q 15 / Q 16 by PDS-voters

	No PDS-voters	Saxonian PDS-voters	Other PDS-voters
1 "fully agree"	13,0%/26,1%	66,7%/18,6%	37,5%/42,9%
2 "mostly agree"	26,1%/36,9%	19,1%/9,3%	12,5%/42,9%
1+2	39,1%/63,0%	83,8%/27,9%	50,0%/85,8%
3 "mostly disagree"	34,8%/28,3%	14,3%/51,2%	37,5%/14,3%
4 "fully disagree"	26,1%/8,7%	0,0%/20,9%	12,5%/0,0%
3+4	60,9%/37,0%	14,3%/72,1%	50,0%/14,3%
All	100,0%/100,0%	100,1%/100,0%	100,0%/100,1%

In our last table (tab. 45) we will see that even those who do not vote PDS see a need for a UBI-party in parliament. A big majority of Saxonian PDS-voters sees this need, more than PDS-voters from outside Saxonia. Perhaps I exaggerate by saying that many PDS-voters and members who see the need for a party that promotes the idea of an UBI think that this party already exists: the PDS, at least in Saxonia.

Table 45: Q 24 by PDS-voters

	No PDS-voters	Saxonian PDS-voters	Other PDS-voters
1 "fully agree"	35,6%	85,7%	50,0%
2 "mostly agree"	35,6%	9,5%	33,3%
1+2	71,2%	95,2%	83,3%
3 "mostly disagree"	17,8%	4,8%	16,7%

4 "fully disagree"	11,1%	0,0%	0,0%
3+4	28,9%	4,8%	16,7%
All	100,1%	100,0%	100,0%

Maybe people in the Saxon PDS who are against a UBI did not fill out my questionnaire because they do not like me nor UBI. However, as said in the beginning, my population can show just a tendency. This tendency seems clear: in contrast to my initial fears, a socialist ideology, socialist programmatics are no obstacle for being open-minded towards an UBI. No doubt that traditional socialist working-ethics are still a problem for UBI-activists. But due to many initiatives in the Saxonian PDS, mostly by the PDS-youth, more and more party-members are beginning to realize that an UBI leads to a decommodification of human work. The ability of humans to be creative will no longer be a commodity under UBI-conditions: paid work will lead to a more comfortable life but would not be the condition for surviving. The second column of capitalism, the private property of means of production, however, would not be touched by an UBI. Therefore many socialists accept an UBI only as a means or even only a step to overcome capitalism but not as a goal by itself.

Only absolute hardliners can deny that an UBI is a charming idea to stop welfare retrenchment: the institutionalisation of welfare instead of workfare independently from the situation on the work marked.

Many results of my investigation have differed from my observations in the PDS itself; the reality might be between both of them. Maybe by these quantitative data we have got the insight that youth in general differs significantly from PDS-youth who are very open to UBI-ideas. Therefore it will be more than important for the future to convince more young people at universities, schools, unions and wherever else that an UBI is an interesting and possible alternative to welfare retrenchment. Older and more traditionalist left-wing people are not necessarily an obstacle for enforcing an UBI-movement. The conditions for such a perspective would be to promote a complex strategy containing an UBI, shorter working times and the creation of more working places. We can conclude that there is a real chance that CBI-programmatics of the PDS can be developed into UBI-programmatics. For quantitative reasons this would never be possible without the older generation; according to my data, however, this can be achieved together with the older generation.

Unfortunately, parts of the PDS-establishment are against an UBI. But the combination of socialist programmatic and UBI should not be lost. And with this perspective, a socialist party can be attractive for certain Greens, Liberals and Christians as well, can be at least a partner for them. A partner whose program – beside more traditional left-wing positions – offers a new and original one.