USBIG Discussion paper no. 37, July 2002

SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND WORKFARE IN THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE:

FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT

Joel F. Handler*

“We have ended welfare as we know it.”

President Bill Clinton

“No one has a right to be lazy.”

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder

“Men fought for the right to live from their labor, not to be supported by the welfare state. Thus, progress demands reinventing the idea of the right to work, rather than shaping a right to income.”

Pierre Rosanvallon

”insertion contracts are a load of rubbish, they don’t guarantee anything.”

French RMI recipient

I. Introduction

This paper deals with “welfare” in the U.S., the program primarily for poor single mothers and their families, and “workfare”-- or, the preferred term, “activation” in Western Europe, the “active labor market policies” (ALMP) that deal primarily with the long-term unemployed, unemployed youth, lone parents, immigrants, and other vulnerable groups, usually lumped together as the “socially excluded.” I explore the ideologies that have led to these changes comparing different views of social citizenship. The Western Europeans argue that their changes, although they resemble the U.S. in some respects, are significantly different both in ideology and in practice. I raise questions about those claims.

The move towards active labor market policies in Western Europe represents a fundamental change in both the meaning of social citizenship and the administration of social welfare. Social benefits are rights that attach by virtue of status – the status of citizenship. Under the new regime, benefits become conditional. Rights only attach if obligations are fulfilled. In this sense, social citizenship changes from status to contract. What brought about this change? There have been significant changes in the labor market -- an increasing demand for higher levels of skills and education, new service jobs for the low-skilled, an increase in part-time and flexible work. While these changes have increased opportunities, they have also created barriers for the low-skilled and under-educated, low wages, and employment insecurity especially for women and youth.[1] There has a major increase in female labor market participation. Most significantly, for more than two decades, most Western European countries have been struggling with sluggish economies and persistent long-term unemployment – called “Eurosclerosous.”[2] In some countries growth and employment have resumed, but in several, long-term unemployment remains high. There is deep concern about “worklessness,” the socially excluded. Welfare states are under great stress – from the unemployed, an aging population, rising health care costs; but government budgets are constrained by the monetary union.

The economic establishment and most political leaders think that a major part of the problem is the costs and inflexibility of the labor market, caused, in part, by an overly generous welfare state which discourages work and feeds a dependency culture. In order for employment to grow, labor must become more flexible and the welfare state must be changed from “passive” to “active.” An “active” welfare state will not only encourage job growth, it will also help bring the socially excluded back into the paid labor market and thereby restore true citizenship. It is a program of inclusion.[3]

Thus, in both the U.S. and Western Europe, the proponents of workfare believe that the surest, most stable path to inclusion is via the paid labor market. Lawrence Mead says that the employable poor want to work, but that the permissiveness of the U.S. welfare system has led them astray. The poor need authority, the imposition of obligations. Mead is interested in helping, not punishing the poor.[4] Pierre Rosanvallon, in his book, The New Social Question: Rethinking the Welfare State,[5] believes that the workfare contracts between the government and the client will empower the client. It is through the welfare contract that the capacities of the socially excluded will be developed and they will be included back into society, into citizenship.

The thesis of this paper is that inclusion through workfare obligations is contradictory. Positive acts of inclusion necessarily result in exclusion – those who cannot negotiate the barriers. Some barriers are structural, many of which are beyond the control of welfare departments. Others are individual. The importance of the deficits in individual capacities is obvious. The point that I want to emphasize is administrative capacity – an issue of critical importance – but is often ignored or assumed away. Active programs make significant new demands on field-level administration. Workfare is administered at the local offices. Field-level workers are now required to make individualized discretionary decisions as to whether the obligations have been fulfilled, what counts as an excuse, and what sanctions, if any, to impose. Selectivity rules invariably are complex. In addition to the usual forms of bureaucratic disentitlement – delays, frustrations, unfriendly relationships, errors, and so forth – behavioral tests require officials to interpret, apply, and monitor and rules and regulations, benefits and sanctions.[6] Organizations are responsive to their political and social environments for support and cooperation and to avoid hostility. To manage these conflicting demands, and get through the day, officials stereotype claimants, sort those who are more likely to respond, defer or sanction those who are judged to be difficult. There is inevitably exclusion – those who cannot, for whatever reason – comply with the rules.

In this paper, I will first introduce the concepts of social citizenship. Today, the concept of citizenship is much debated. It is argued, for example, that citizenship should be transnational or global rather than bound by the nation, that it is a process rather than a status.[7] Here, I will take the more traditional definition of social citizenship as developed in Western Europe in the decades following World War II. I contrast this definition with the concept of citizenship in the U.S., which is based on contract rather than status. I then introduce the European “Third Way” which redefines social citizenship from status to contract in an effort to cope with the current strains on the welfare state. A brief description of the experience of the recent U.S. welfare state reforms highlights the questions that I raise concerning Western Europe. I discuss the changes in Western Europe -- in ideology and in welfare state policies. Thus far, there is not a great deal of empirical data coming out of Europe,[8] but there are hints of significant similarities in administration. I conclude with an argument for a Basic Income Guarantee to provide, among other things, an exit option for welfare recipients when “contracting” with government.

II. Social Citizenship

Citizenship commonly refers to a legal/political status within a nation state. The status has certain entitlements – the right to permanent residence within the state, to hold property, to use the legal system, and (with some qualifications) to vote and to hold office. Social citizenship refers to welfare state provisions – the supports that are designed to lessen the risks of sickness or disability, old age, unemployment, lack of income. States vary as to whether non-citizens can receive such benefits. Citizenship, then, describes concrete, positive, legal entitlements. Citizenship is also used in an ideological or symbolic sense -- to distinguish people from others within the borders or from those who are outside the borders. It is often used as a term of exclusion, of moral superiority, a construction of the Other.

Social citizenship rights are commonly analyzed in economic terms -- e.g., decommodifying labor, protection against risks to earning capacity, reducing poverty. The core, though, of social citizenship rights, as with all citizenship rights, is fundamentally moral. Redistribution is an act of solidarity, of inclusion. The moral issues are multi-dimensional. They are captured in the Anglo-American concept of the "undeserving poor." Although ostensibly about work effort, these moral judgments involve race, ethnicity, gender, family responsibilities, sexuality, and various forms of deviant behavior.[9] Western Europe is experiencing increasing strains in solidarity from the socially excluded and the huge volume of cross-border migration from all over the world. [10]

As stated, this paper will be restricted to the traditional concept of social citizenship developed in Western Europe in the decades following World War II, now referred to as the Golden Age. The initial formulation of social citizenship is attributed to the British economist, T.H. Marshall. In Marshall’s formulation, civil rights, developed in the 18th Century, included free speech, access to the legal system, rights to a fair trail, and rights of contract and property. Political rights -- the extension of the franchise, the secret ballot, the right to hold office -- were products of the 19th Century (for men). Social rights belong to the 20th Century -- entitlements to social security when faced with unemployment, sickness, old age, and other kinds of hardship, that is, protections from the rigors of capitalist labor markets.[11]

Marshall was concerned with the contradiction between formal political equality and individual freedom, on the one hand, and significant social and economic inequality on the other.[12] The social entitlements of the welfare state would reconcile, or at least lessen the conflicts between capitalism and civil and political citizenship.[13] Social rights would enable people to exercise civil and political rights. Social rights would give individuals a sense of security, which, in turn, would foster a sense of a collective identity between the state and its citizens. He coined the term "social citizenship."

At the time that Marshall wrote, the economies of Western Europe enjoyed expanding growth and very low unemployment rates. It was during this period that the exemplary welfare states were created. Although the various countries took different paths, nevertheless, according to Esping-Anderson, the starting point was the granting of rights with “the legal and practical status of property rights"[14] Because these rights are based on "citizenship rather than performance, they will entail a decommodification of the status of individuals vis-a-vis the market."[15] Decommodification is a matter of degree. The extent to which an individual is liberated from the market depends on the nature of the social benefit -- both the conditions of aid and its adequacy. When benefits are low and based on need, the market is actually strengthened. Even when benefits are generous and based on fairly strong insurance-like entitlements, there still will not be much decommodification, if contributions are based on employment.[16] It was only in the late 1960s and 1970s that some states approached decommodification -- with a minimum proof of medical impairment, one could receive sickness insurance benefits equal to his or her normal wage as long as that individual thinks necessary. The same would be true for unemployment, pensions, maternity leave and child care.

Looking at various social welfare states in terms of social rights and social stratification, Esping-Anderson constructed his well-known three clusters of regime-types. (1) The "liberal" state (the U.S., Canada, Australia) consists mainly of means-tested, low benefits designed to reinforce labor-market participation; here, decommodification is at a minimum. (2) In the historic corporatist-statist model (Austria, France, Germany, Italy), status differences are upgraded to take account of new class structures. There is only modest redistribution. There is considerable emphasis on the traditional family -- family benefits encourage motherhood and discourage mothers in the paid labor force (e.g., minimal day care benefits). (3) In the "social democratic" regime-types (Scandinavia), universalism and decommodification have been extended into the new middle classes to promote equality between workers and the middle class. While benefits reflect earnings, there is no private social insurance market. Family costs are socialized to allow women to choose the labor market. The viability of this high cost welfare state depends on most people working and the fewest number dependent on transfers.[17]

Social Citizenship in the United States

Fraser and Gordon note that in the U.S. while there is a rich discourse on civil citizenship -- civil rights, individual liberties, freedom of speech -- there is almost a total absence of the term "social citizenship." The reason is that "social citizenship" implies entitlements. "People who are 'social citizens' get 'social rights,' not 'handouts.'" In the United States, “Welfare is usually considered grounds of disrespect, a threat to, rather than a realization of citizenship. . . . The connotations of citizenship are so positive, powerful and proud, while those of 'welfare' are so negative, weak, and degraded, that 'social citizenship' here sounds almost oxymoronic."[18] In the U.S., welfare was always coupled with obligations, a contract. It is not a formal, legal contract, but contract based on the moral obligations of citizenship. There is always the concern that severing the link between work and income would erode the work ethic.

With the War on Poverty and the legal rights movements in the 1960s, welfare became an “entitlement.” Conservatives then attacked the liberal welfare regime on two fronts. Charles Murray, in Losing Ground (1984)[19] argued that the Great Society programs of the 1960s, by rewarding the “undeserving poor,” were responsible for the rise in unemployment, crime, single-parent households, and out-of-wedlock births among African-Americans. Lawrence Mead, in Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship (1986)[20] argued that by not insisting on behavioral changes – primarily work – these policies resulted in an erosion of the work ethic. The poor want to work, want to be responsible citizens, but “it is something they would like to do, but not something they feel they must do at any cost. It is an aspiration but not an obligation.”[21] Mead says that workfare is not coercive; rather it is an exercise in authority.[22] As will be discussed, in the 1980s, the liberals also endorsed the obligation to work.[23] And this is now the current U.S. welfare policy. Entitlements have been abolished. Welfare recipients have obligations, not rights. “Contract” remains the moral definition of social citizenship.

The European “Third Way” Position

As noted, the Conservatives or neoliberals look at the U.S. and now the U.K. and argue that labor has to become more “flexible” -- more part-time jobs, less protection against lay-offs, lower employment-related benefits, lower payroll taxes – and the welfare state has to be changed from “passive” to “active” to provide incentives for the socially excluded to enter the labor market. The opposition says that in the U.S., there is unprecedented inequality and growing poverty. In most Western European countries, the Conservatives had been rejected. Social Democrats were returned to office with the pledge of finding a path to economic recovery that will, at the same time, preserve the welfare state. There have been some changes in the welfare states, but so far, the basic programs -- pensions, disability, health care -- have remained in tact which, with changes in labor and demography, are now very costly. In most countries, unemployment remains unacceptably high, especially for the most vulnerable, the conflicts between the haves and have-nots have not diminished, and tensions over immigrants are increasing, but the demands for welfare state preservation, if not expansion, conflict with the budgetary austerity requirements of the EU. There now seems to be swing back to the Conservatives.

In an attempt to move out of this impasse, the Social Democrats adopted the “Third Way” which seeks to steer a middle course between the traditional defenders of the existing welfare state and the neoliberals who want to dismantle the welfare state. I take as one example of the Third Way, Pierre Rosanvallon, an intellectual figure within the “second left” in France.[24] Agreeing with the neoliberals, Rosanvallon thinks that with long-term unemployment and social exclusion, the passive welfare state becomes “pernicious.” It destroys solidarity by increasing the indirect costs of labor which eventually further reduces employment.[25] Is there a way out? The “logic of solidarity” will now have to be built on a system of direct redistribution which will rely on citizenship and citizenship, in turn, depends on “a sort of moral covenant.” Here, Rosanvallon develops his ideas of contract. There are individual differences which may account for social exclusion. Certain differences should be dealt with through anti-discrimination policies; others, such as disability, through social and political means. But the central problem revolves around “behaviorable” variables – the disparities that arise from “voluntary actions” which are both moral and psychological. The welfare state has to deal with these individual differences.

There has to be a new form of reintegration with “an expanded reunderstanding of social rights.” This means changing “payment for idleness to payment for work.” This is the “right to work.” The right to work has to be applied to the specific individuals. Rosanvallon recognizes that there is a history of requiring work which runs the risk of controlling behavior. How are the negative effects to be avoided? A new conception of the social management of employment has to be created. This would build on the concept of inclusion. The reforms in France (the RMI) and the U.S. are good examples of this middle way. They are based on a mutual commitment between the individual and the collective. The excluded have a right to a minimum income to allow them to re-enter society but also a contract – the beneficiary’s “commitment to inclusion.” The commitments are diverse: training, public works, personal efforts are readjustment (e.g., detoxification). These are individually determined – the “individualized right.” RMI does supervise behavior; thus, it is not a right in the strictly legal sense, but it also not “legal charity.” He calls RMI a “third type of society” – neither traditional social aid nor classic social protection which is mechanically distributed to beneficiaries. This is the same with the current American welfare, which will soon become familiar in Europe. “Neither the market nor the state can ‘solve’ the problem. In both cases, social rights are reinterpreted as a contract articulating rights and obligations.”[26] Democratic inclusion has to be based on equality through contract.

According to Rossanvallon, the relationship of contract will be empowering. Individuals become full members of society. They not only have the right to live, “but the right to live in society.” The obligation is also a “positive constraint” on society. Society is to take rights “seriously.” This is the “path of mutual involvement.” “The subject is considered an autonomous, responsible person capable of making commitments and honoring them.”[27] Thus, the RMI contract “is not a restriction of freedom but an instance of constructing society, a radical reconsideratioin of the organizing principles of individualistic society.”[28] He calls this “contractual individualism.”[29]

While there are many negative attitudes and stereotypes implicit in the recent welfare changes, this is not true of Rosanvallon, the Third Way, and many of the U.S. liberals who now favor obligations. Rather, they believe that re-integration into the paid labor market is the one sure way of re-establishing social citizenship. Nevertheless, there are many objections to this re-definition of social citizenship. Clients are to become integrated through contract, a contract of obligation. In theory, contract assumes independent, knowledgeable, voluntary individuals. It is here that the concern arises. The assumption of equality of contracting parties is far from reality. Welfare recipients are dependent people; they are in no position to bargain. We will return to this issue more fully after we review the experience in the U.S. and Western Europe.

III. The American Welfare Reform

Under the 1996 reform, welfare is no longer an “entitlement.” AFDC has been replaced by Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).[30] What is new is the significant ideological and policy commitment to work, enforced by time limits. Previously, welfare would last as long as the youngest child was under 18. Now, recipients cannot receive welfare for more than two continuous years and there is a cumulative five‑year limit on federal cash assistance (with exceptions for no more than twenty percent of the caseload). States are required to move an increasing percentage of welfare recipients into the work force increasing to fifty percent by 2002. States are required to reduce grant amounts for recipients who refuse to participate in "work or work activities."[31]

The basis of the reform is the “work first” strategy. The assumptions behind this position are: (1) there are plenty of jobs for those who want to work; (2) by taking any job, even an entry‑level job, and sticking with that job, a person will move up the employment ladder; (3) the problem with welfare recipients is that they do not have the motivation or the incentives to leave welfare and enter the paid labor markets; and, (4) the state programs have shown that recipients can be moved from welfare to work. The idea is to move not only current recipients but also applicants ‑ before they get on welfare ‑ into the labor market as quickly as possible rather than place them in longer-term training or education programs.

Despite the publicity, the results of the prior state demonstration projects have been very modest. There was very little difference in employment between the control groups and the experimentals; earnings increased only about $500 per year and often failed to account for the costs of working, and most leavers remained in poverty. Welfare payments were reduced, thus resulting in welfare savings for the government.[32] The reason for these modest results is that the assumptions behind welfare‑to‑work programs are totally misconceived as to the characteristics of the low-wage labor market and who welfare recipients are.

The “success story” of the U.S. economy is well known. Since 1990, over 20 million new jobs have been created with low unemployment and inflation. On the other hand, there has been stagnation in the real wages of the less skilled, less educated workers.[33] For a while, the inequality in women's wages narrowed, primarily because of an increase in the hours worked and the decline in male earnings[34] Jobs are increasingly contingent or short‑term, and without benefits. Hours per week vary a great deal causing conflicts with family arrangements, other jobs, and transportation[35] Turnover rates among new hires are high.[36] Thus, employment instability and low wages continue to be a major problem for the less-skilled and disadvantaged workers -- young workers, minorities, single parent families, and those who lack a high-school diploma.[37] Low‑wage workers are not moving up the economic ladder.[38] Strict time limits on welfare fail to take into account the instability of lower-wage work.[39] Given the characteristics of the low-wage labor market, it is no surprise that there are still millions living in poverty or close to it. In 2000, 11.3% (31 million people) were living below the official poverty line of $17,603 for a family of four.[40] Moreover, 13.8 million had incomes of less than one-half of the poverty line.[41] Thus, although more Americans are working harder, inequality and poverty remain severe among the working poor.

The Work Experience of Welfare Recipients

Contrary to the stereotype, most welfare recipients are adults with small families (1.9 children, on average) and are on welfare for relatively short periods ‑ between two and four years. Long‑term dependency (five years or more) is rare ‑ perhaps as low as fifteen percent. The largest proportion of welfare recipients are connected to the paid labor market. Many package work with welfare and the most common route off of welfare is via a job. However, those who leave welfare often have to return. The low‑skilled labor market produces cycling back and forth between work and welfare.[42] They have to use welfare because in most states, they do not qualify for Unemployment Insurance.[43]

Welfare recipients do not fare particularly well in the competition for these low‑skilled jobs. Employers of low‑skilled workers are looking for high school diplomas, work experience, and mainly social skills (“soft skills”). They often hire through networks, and, in general, prefer workers with similar ethnic backgrounds. African‑Americans are at the end of the queue. Nevertheless, between half and two-thirds of leavers find jobs shortly after leaving welfare.[44] Most of the jobs are in sales, food preparation, clerical support, and other service jobs. There are substantial periods of unemployment. The pay is between $5.67 to $8.42 per hour. Average reported annual earnings range from $8,000 to $15,144, thus leaving many families in poverty. Most do not receive employer-provided health insurance, paid sick or vacation leave.[45] It would be hard to exaggerate the difficulties of child care for poor working mothers; yet most do not receive child care subsidies.[46] Under the new law, welfare recipients no longer automatically qualify for Medicaid and Food Stamps and there has been a serious drop in enrollments.[47]

Those still remaining on the rolls have the most serious barriers to employment. Nearly 50 percent of recipients have not completed high school.[48] Three-quarters of the adults on welfare have at least one potential barrier to employment including poor mental or physical health, limited education, minimal or no work experience, and family responsibilities.[49]

The Decline in the Welfare Rolls

If employment is so uncertain, then what accounts for the dramatic decline in the welfare rolls? The welfare rolls have fallen from 12.2 million people in 1996 to 5.3 million.[50] Politicians, of course, claim that welfare reform is "working" ‑ despite the fact that rolls were declining significantly before many of the work requirements were enacted.[51] Most economists agree that the macro economy is responsible for a decline in the welfare rolls, but differ as to the relative importance of the economy versus welfare reform; estimates as to the effect of welfare reform range from “trivial” to 30 to 40%.[52]

A major difficulty involves what is meant by “welfare reform.” There are a number of possibilities: the welfare-to-work programs; the time-limits; the sanctions, or combinations of all three. Another complication arises from the use of discretion in administering these reforms. Not only the states, but the individual offices vary greatly in how they interpret and apply these rules.[53] Then, there has been a significant increase in benefits to working families that provide strong incentives to work but are not considered part of “welfare reform.” Since the late 1980s, benefits have increased from about $5 billion (1997 dollars) in federal aid to more than $50 billion in 1997. About half of this growth is with the Earned Income Tax Credit – a refundable tax credit of up to 40% of earnings for low-income families.[54] Some scholars consider the Earned Income Tax Credit the single most important influence on the decline in welfare rolls.[55] Other factors could include the increase in the minimum wage in 1997.[56]

Administrative Capacity

Since the 1960s, the federal and the state governments imposed strict quality control measures on local offices. The focus is on reducing eligibility and payment errors. Extensive documentation is required including birth certificates, Social Security numbers, all changes in income and assets, as well as other eligibility and income data. The 1996 welfare reform requires extensive changes from eligibility compliance to individual, intensive casework guiding clients into the labor market, but this has not happen. At the street-level, the focus is still on reducing errors and eliminating fraud and getting the work done in a timely manner.[57] The TANF requirements were simply added to this culture of compliance which has greatly increased administrative burdens. Many more client contacts are necessary to both guide and check on workfare progress and compliance, but information systems are inadequate, and workers are often unable to obtain even basic information on individual recipients. In some states, workers could even tell clients how much time they had left.[58]

Implementing Sanctions

Most states have chosen to implement strict sanctions. Thirty-seven states have full-family sanctions for violations of work and other personal responsibility requirements.[59] At least 31 states have implemented some form of diversion program.[60] A widespread practice is to require applicants to conduct job search while the application is pending. Requirements range from 2 to 6 weeks and from 2 to 40 employer contacts before benefits can start. The responsibility is on the individual rather than the program. Again, there is considerable caseworker discretion as to who is required, who is excused, and what constitutes an excuse.

There are difficulties in communicating the most basic information about sanctions and time limits.[61] Despite repeated explanations, recipients did not understand them and large numbers of recipients were not aware that they had been sanctioned, or what was expected of them or what benefits they would lose and for how long. [62] Virtually all states have some form of grievance procedure where clients can appeal.[63] In the past, the right of appeal in welfare cases was largely ineffectual.[64] Under the present regime, there is more confusion and lack of awareness.

It is now clear that states make widespread use of sanctions.[65] A GAO study (1998) found that an average of 135,800 families each month (4.5% of the national caseload) received a full or partial sanction; an average of 16,000 families were cut completely.[66] Seven states reported that sanctions accounted for one-fifth or more of their case closures in 1999.[67] Sanctioned recipients have a number of employment barriers[68] Most sanctions are imposed because of missed appointments and deadlines; clients are seldom aware of “good cause” exemptions and often think that that the sanctions for non-participation are more severe than they are in fact. These results indicate the difficulty that welfare offices have in adequately communicating welfare requirements and sanctions to clients. It is the combination of cognitive barriers and poor communication that is a major predictor of sanctions.[69] Many agency staff firmly believe that sanctions communicate the seriousness of the requirements.[70] Other studies show that neither the threat of sanctions nor the imposition of sanctions change behavior. The available data suggests that most people do not comply with program requirements even after a sanction is imposed.[71]

Some Lessons from the American Experience that Might be Applicable to Western Europe

Here, I draw out some important, general characteristics of the American welfare experience and ask, to what extent are these possibly issues for the Europeans.

Welfare Office Strategies: Moral Typification; Myth and Ceremony

Prior work programs were never really enforced. Most recipients were deflected (put on administrative “hold”) and few got jobs. The reason for the general failure of implementation was the lack of administrative capacity. I described how the offices were changed to emphasize strict monitoring controls; the staff became eligibility clerks and technicians who are undertrained, underpaid, and overworked. Yet, policymakers make the political, symbolic gestures of reform and not worry about administration. This is especially true with the welfare-to-work programs. The path that welfare has taken is thus contradictory. The emphasis on controlling “waste, fraud, and abuse” has resulted in bureaucratization, computerized rule enforcement, and the proletarianization of the workforce -- in short, an organization that is administratively incapable of carrying out work programs which, at least in theory, are supposed to require individualized consultation and assessment, planning, contracts, supervision, and follow-up. Further complicating implementation is the delegation of authority. Federal and state work requirements are in the form of mandates which addressed to the local offices. There are over 3,000 counties in the United States, in the larger counties, there are several local offices. Thus, there are thousands of local variations in the day-to-day administration of the work programs. These local offices, in turn, often have to rely on other local service providers (e.g., employment, training) who have missions other than serving welfare recipients.

Recipients must accept suitable offers of employment or participate in pre-employment activities; if, without cause, they fail to do so, they are subject to sanction. Within these seemingly simple requirements, lie volumes of rules, regulations, standards, and interpretations. There is an enormous amount of paperwork; everything has to be documented and computer systems are often faulty. But despite the quantity of rules, a great many of the most crucial decisions require discretion on the part of the field-level workers. The work program is an add-on to the welfare office. Now, the welfare office is directed to run an employment program, but it is not an employment service. It doesn't want to be an employment service, it doesn't have the expertise, and although it is often given additional resources, they are rarely sufficient. All organizations -- welfare agencies, community colleges, adult education programs -- seek legitimacy and support from their environments. They try to present themselves as efficient, capable institutions that are fulfilling their mission. Thus, welfare agencies will select clients who fit the rules, who follow the rules, and who don't cause problems.

Selecting, processing, and changing people involve moral judgments. Yeheskel Hasenfeld has described the process as moral typification.[72] Workers classify clients according to pre-conceptions. The welfare agency will attempt to select those clients who fit organizational needs. They screen in confirming information and ignore conflicting information. Client responses become self-fulfilling prophecies.[73] Programs select and train the most promising and deflect those who may need the services the most. Agencies punish those fail to comply. Workers apply rules strictly, impose sanctions, minimize errors, and try to get through the day as quickly and painlessly as possible. Requests for change or required change consume scarce administrative time and run the risk of error. Clients with problems become problems. Whatever the program demands, the staff response will be survival, and not necessarily service to clients. Because individual field-level decisions are shrouded in factual assessments, supervision is difficult, assuming there is the will to do so.[74]

The idea of the “contract” in this setting is an exercise in myth and ceremonies. In her study of JOBS in Chicago, Evelyn Brodkin and her colleagues, showed how the caseworkers fit the client into available slots and ignored information about service needs they could not respond to. Caseworkers would send clients on job searches even though the clients did not meet the required level of education or literacy proficiency. “Favored” clients received education or vocational training. In discussing the impact of “performance-based contracts,” Brodkin says, “[Such] contracts were almost perfectly designed to reward [service contractors] for placing clients in lower-wage jobs with the least to offer, jobs, not surprisingly, which are in relatively constant demand, due to their volatility. Even the state’s minimal ‘retention’ measure (150 non-consecutive days of work) can be satisfied by churning individuals through a sequence of low-wage, dead-end jobs.”[75] The welfare recipients had little recourse in trying to get the welfare department to meet its part of the contract.[76]

The findings by Brodkin are not surprising and are replicated in many other instances. Yet, it is disturbing that welfare reformers seem to learn so little from history. As Alvin Schorr reminds us, social contracts were the social work strategy of the 1950s and 1960s.[77] They did not work then primarily for the same administrative constraints that Brodkin describes over 40 years later. In the past, the workers would deflect the more troublesome cases. Now, they are sanctioned.

If the above is the general story of the welfare-to-work programs, what accounts for their continued re-enactment? Here, we are in the realm of symbolic politics, of myth and ceremony. The current the myth is the “work first” strategy. The country was determined to “end welfare as we know it.” The “work first” strategy was clear, it was effectively communicated and it didn’t matter that of those who worked, almost all remained in poverty. The companion myth, which is prevalent in the Western European Third Way is contract. The welfare recipient and the socially excluded will enter into a contract of inclusion with the welfare department; both sides will mutually agree on an individualized decision; and through participation, the excluded will re-enter society.

IV. Workfare in Western Europe

There have been a variety of policy responses to Eurosclerosous. Here, we are concerned with workfare, or the preferred term, active labor market policies (ALMP), now common throughout Europe. In return for benefits, recipients must seek work or participate in work related activities, including, if appropriate, education and training.[78] The “job first” principle has spread throughout Europe.[79] While most countries are pursuing the reforms according to their own traditions and institutions (called “path dependent”[80]), “benefit conditionality [has] moved to centre-stage.”[81] Moreover, the ideology behind activation is not just a response to Euroscelrousis. Compulsory activation is increasing in Denmark, even with low unemployment, pursuant to the principle that “’everyone with at least some work capacity to work should work.’”[82] Norway with no welfare crisis, has adopted workfare.[83] Both the Right and the Left agreed that extensive rights to generous benefits threatened the ability to become self-sufficient and that individual responsibilities and obligations are more important than individual rights. Means-testing, rather than “an unfortunate remnant of the past,” would be more positively viewed as “targeting.” This change was not the result of a conservative backlash against the welfare state. Rather, according to Ivar Lødomel, the Norwegian Labour Party reflected the contemporary Social Democrats in other countries that have endorsed the changes in the welfare state.[84]

There are three basic workfare components: (1) existing policies of encouraging the disabled and older workers from leaving the labor force should be reversed; (2) those who are on the “margins” of the labor force should be placed in jobs or training; and (3) work requirements for the unemployed should be tightened. What is new are activation measures applied to social assistance recipients. The goal is to prevent the deserving from sliding into the undeserving and to re-integrate the undeserving.[85]

While changes are occurring in all Western European countries, I can only very briefly summarize some of the workfare experiences in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Germany. The U.K. initiated the change from a passive to an active welfare state, and, at this point, is probably the furthest down the road. Sweden and Norway are at the other end of the spectrum -- the most universal, decommodified welfare states, which are still in tact. Denmark and the Netherlands are the most frequently cited examples of countries that have successfully met the challenge of persistent long-term unemployment. In France the Social Democratic governments have publicly rejected the U.S.-U.K. model of low-wage jobs and increasing income inequality, but have not yet found a way to reduce persistent long-term unemployment as well as other high costs of the welfare state. In Germany, the SchrÅder Government, in opposition to the unions, has chosen a strategy to open up a low-wage segment of the market. There are to be temporary subsidies to employees who take low-wage work.[86]

The record thus far with active labor market policies is mixed. Most of the goals cannot be accomplished quickly, and with few exceptions, the empirical evidence at the field level is uneven. A recent report evaluating workfare in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and the U.K. concluded that most of the studies were not well designed to answer the basic question of whether the participants benefit from the programs or were worse off; the results are “suggestive rather than conclusive.” [87] I am concerned with the risks to the most vulnerable, consequently will be emphasizing negative findings more than the positive. It is easier for governments and other proponents of the reforms to emphasize the positive and ignore or downplay those who drop through the cracks; this is what mainstream society wants to hear.

In the U.K., New Labour has extended the policies of mandatory activity to “workless” groups. In the New Deal for Young People, after 6 months of benefits, there is a “gateway” period consisting of intensive jobs search, followed by options which can include training, education, subsidized employment, or work in voluntary or environmental jobs, and self-employment. If there is still no unsubsidized employment, there is a “follow through” period for further intensive support. During the gateway period (which can last up to 4 months), the participant is supposed to be available for an option and actively seeking work. Each participant is assigned a “Personal Advisor” who draws up an “Action Plan” which is supposed to set “’realistic achievable job goals.’” A new generation of front line Employment Service personal advisers has been given more flexibility to identify and deal with barriers and assist claimants with job search. The purpose is to “forge an entirely new culture” by promoting a work orientation for all claimants.[88] There can be sanctions for “’willfully and persistently’” refusal to participate. Once the gateway is complete, the options are compulsory. Sanctions can be 2 to 4 weeks, depending on whether there was a previous sanction.[89] The New Deal for the Over 25s is for the long-term unemployed. This group has more barriers than the young and the program is less successful.

Finn and Blackmore report on surveys and focus groups (1997) in four areas of high long-term unemployment.[90] An individual action plan (The Jobseekers Agreement (JSAg) is entered into at the start of benefits. All of the focus group participants were scornful of the JSAg – it was a ten minute interview with a person “who knows nothing about you.” “The claimants sign to get the benefits.” The terms of the participation contracts seem to be largely determined by the officers rather than the recipients. A survey of clients found that less than 30% reported that their fortnightly jobsearch review lasted longer than 6 minutes, and 30% had interviews that lasted for 2 minutes or less. 43% reported that there was actually no discussion about job search, rising to over 90% in some offices. Overall, there is broad agreement that that too many JSAg’s are drawn up mechanically and too many people are forced into meaningless activities. Most respondents had a very critical view of the ES in terms of its ability to help them find work or improve their employability. They felt that the ES had the least attractive jobs and was inefficient in updating vacancies and that the staff did not have enough time or experience to deal with them as individuals. Their primary goal was to remove them from the unemployment rolls rather than offer genuine help. They doubted the value of training when, having completed the courses, they were still unable to find jobs. They resented compulsory job search courses as a waste of time, especially when they were repeated. They attend only to prevent loss of benefits.

The ES workers pointed to a shortage of job opportunities and emphasized that clients had often had significant personal barriers to employment. They complained of a lack of time and resources to perform all the tasks, especially the fortnightly interviews for persons out of work for over 6 months which were supposed to take only 7 minutes per person. They felt that the performance targets are counterproductive and “interfere with listening to jobseekers.” Their problems were exacerbated because jobseekers resisted taking low-quality jobs. Only a third believed that sanctions and penalties were effective at enforcing compliance. The ES is now encountering the unemployed with more barriers. Frequently, necessary services are not available. The greatest challenge is the “revolving door” -- participants get jobs but then a large number are likely to subsequently become unemployed.[91] A common feeling among both claimants and workers was one of frustration -- claimants not been able to find suitable work, workers because of high caseloads and performance targets.[92]

In Sweden, by 1993, unemployment had risen to 8.2% and there was a large increase in the government deficit. All political parties favored reducing entitlements.[93] There was a modest a modest increase in work incentives. There was a large investment in research, development, training, and education. The economy recovered.[94] There has been a significant growth in public employment, largely female, and very expensive. There has been a huge expansion in temporary workers, but part-time employment is considered the same as regular employment. In short, Sweden has rebounded with an in tact welfare state.[95] Nevertheless, Sweden tightened unemployment and has workfare.[96] Sweden offers support for education and training of the unemployed[97] People between 20 and 24 years of age would be offered a place in a municipal work program or a competence-development scheme for up to 12 months. They have to accept any offer or risk losing benefits. The wages are at the level of assistance; there are no unemployment, sick relief, or pension benefits.[98] Thus far, it is unclear what effects the changes have had on employment. Many of the participants found work but it was usually temporary.[99]

In Norway, workfare is for social assistance recipients only, and is supposed to be a last resort, after other services have failed. The local authorities have wide discretion and can apply workfare to a range of recipients – e.g., refugees, asylum seekers, and single parents. Work is restricted to local authority services. It can be created work or work that is performed by regular employees. Training along with work is also discretionary.[100] Some local authorities have used workfare to fill regular city jobs, at about 1/3 of the regular wage; others used it to discourage claimants. The result, according to Lødemel, was that Norway has created a “social division of activation.” Most who are in active labor market schemes enjoy regular wages, regular working hours, and are given time for training. Those who are left – the residuals – are considered the least deserving – and they are subject to social assistance workfare. Thus, at least according to Lødemel, the Norweigan system resembles the U.S. rather than the other European countries.[101]

Everyone cites the Netherlands -- the change from falling productivity, high unemployment, and an expensive, dysfunctional welfare state to a competitive economy, low unemployment, and a leaner, more active welfare state -- from the “Dutch Disease” to the “Dutch Miracle.” Most think that wage moderation in return for a most reduction in working hours, lower taxes, and social security contributions was the key. Unemployment was significantly reduced (5.8% in 1997) by the creation of part-time jobs, mostly women, which accounted for two-thirds of the net new jobs.[102] Despite a series of measures designed to reduce that large numbers of working age people on sickness, disability, and early retirement, there still remains a great deal of “hidden unemployment” as well as gender-discrimination.[103]

By the late 1980s and early 1990s,”Work, Work, Work” became the major political slogan, with widespread popular support.[104] Social assistance recipients are now expected to accept a job, and the unemployed have to actively seek work[105] The various activation programs were consolidated under The Jobseeker’s Employment Act (JEA). There are three principle programs: subsidized regular employment, subsidized municipal employment; and training or “social activation,” which can be combined with subsidized employment. Working conditions are covered by sector collective agreements. The hours are generally about 32 per week; the wages are a little above the minimum but are combined with welfare. Subsidized municipal employment is supposed to lead to a regular job but, in practice, has become an “end station.” Training and activation is mainly for people who are ready for employment but have a specific barrier. Those in training and activation remain on welfare. The income is below the minimum wage; for the young, it is very low.[106] Training and social activation is compulsory for the young. The young, in subsidized municipal work, work under different working conditions than regular workers. The work is considered “second rate” but they have to work if they want any income.[107] Thus far, cooperation between social services and employment offices has “not been optimal,” especially with respect to the “hard core.” The employment offices generally “cream.” There is serious drop-out problem. In 1996, 54% leavers found regular employment; 8% went back to school; 25% dropped out and lost benefits; and 13% left for other reasons. The drop-outs, who generally have more problems than the other participants, are entirely on their own and are considered serious risks for “severe marginalization.”[108]

Research on JEA is not yet available. Under the Guaranteed Youth Employment Act (GYA), which in 1998 became part of JEA, municipalities were required to offer a contract even though placement opportunities may not be available. In 1996, about 20% of the vulnerable groups (low-education, immigrants, no work experience) were on “empty contracts,” that is, no placements were available. The participation percentages only included the young unemployed who had registered at the employment agencies and thus outside the official systems – e.g., drifters, young migrant women workers who are not allowed to do paid work, etc.[109] In a study of Rotterdam, the young outside the system have very problematic backgrounds. They, benefit the least from the program.[110]

In the mid and late 1990s, Dutch policy was changed to require lone mothers on social assistance with children over 5 years of age to seek work.[111] The composition had changed from largely widows to mainly divorced and unmarried. There was an increase in poverty. Activation policies were introduced but child care was not developed and remained of poor quality. These mothers tended to resist the work, especially because they felt that child-care was inadequate. The caseworkers at the municipal level also resisted the policy. They were trained as payment officers. Putting lone mothers in various activation categories would significantly increase their tasks, and they were ambivalent as to how to deal with this class of social assistance clients; they were reluctant to require them to work full-time which would not improve their income and create more administrative work. A majority were exempted.[112]

According to Uwe Becker, non-employment is still high.[113] The redistribution of work was to part-timers and the younger and healthier workers.[114] Islamic males from Turkey and Morocco, have 6 times the unemployment rate as Dutch males; males form Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, 4 times, and other cultural minorities 5 times. The overall unemployment rate of immigrants is 3 times the Dutch indigenous rate. In France and Germany, the immigrant employment rate is 60-70% higher than the Dutch rate.[115]

In Denmark, unemployment reached 12.2% in 1993. Activation focused on improving skills and work experience, emphasizing training and education, and empowerment. But social assistance could be denied to those who rejected a fair offer of activation.[116] In 1998, about 74,000 participated in activation. The largest number was in subsidized employment in the private sector. Within a year, a little over half (51%) of the short-term unemployed found regular employment as compared to less than 20% of the long-term unemployed. Job placements in the private sector were the most successful in producing regular employment, which, according to Roche, may have been the result of creaming in the activation placements.[117]

By 1999, unemployment was 6%. Still, there were large numbers on unemployment benefits, social assistance, early retirement, and sickness benefits.[118] Youth unemployment remained high and there was an increase in social assistance. Soon, part-time work and workfare was supported by all political parties (except the extreme Right).[119] Successive governments established an “Active Line” for the “workless” based on two principles – both the state and the private sector have an obligation to provide opportunities for inclusion, and a long-term strategy to reduce unemployment and the removal of social barriers is needed for the “highly marginalized.” There is a division of responsibility between the Ministries of Labour and Social Affaires and local authorities. The municipalities fund half the costs of social assistance.[120] Workfare is to be “offensive” rather than “defensive” – improving skills, self-sufficiency, training and education rather than work-for-benefits; empowerment rather than control and punishment; and more inclusive than just targeting the unemployed.[121] Beneficiaries must take “responsibility for the offers that are being made.”[122] Social services were separated from income transfers and employment. All recipients under 30 years of age were required to be activated within 13 weeks. The activation period was either 6 or 18 months. At the completion of the activation period, the client had the right to a new activation offer within another 13 weeks. There was no specified length of activation period for those over 30.[123]

As employment increased and the pool of recipients became less skilled and less suited for job training, the trend was more towards a greater use of workfare for social assistance. Unemployment began to be considered “voluntary” and local authorities started to use workfare as a work-test.[124] By 1997, nearly two-thirds of all activated recipients were in workfare.[125] With low unemployment, those that remain on social assistance have more significant barriers. At the same time, activation to address the broader social problems has proven difficult to implement. Questions are being raised as to whether the goals for this group should be labor market participation.[126]

In the meantime, activation policy has been tightening for all social assistance recipients, and, as of 1998, obligatory for all recipients.[127] Applicants for social assistance have to demonstrate that they do not have a “suitable work offer,” which is decided by the local authority. The prior wage is not relevant. Recipients must also accept a “reasonable” activation offer. Social assistance families receive 80% of the maximum unemployment insurance benefit, the young 40% if they are living alone, and 20% if they are living with their parents. Generally, there is no time limit for benefits.[128] The quality of the plans and the offers are uneven. There is creaming for the well-qualified unemployed into long-term education plans. There are difficulties in activating weak and marginal groups. At the local level, about 1/3 of the social assistance claimants have difficulty in activation because of serious social problems.[129] Despite these efforts, there remains a large group of marginalized, unemployed. According to a recent study, only 1/2 of those on activation were actually looking for work. Many claim that they have been put in low-pay, low-quality activation.[130] In the meantime, there appears to be a dramatic rise in anti-immigration politics, that immigrants are exploiting the welfare system. The Liberal Party leader “pledged to crack down on foreigners trying to cheat the system.”[131]

In France, a guaranteed minimum allowance was established in 1988 through RMI (revenue minimum d’insertioni) which replaced a variety of local and targeted social assistance programs. RMI provides the right to a minimum income and a right to insertion.[132] RMI is means-tested. It applies to all citizens and long-term residents over the age of 25. While job placement is one of the objectives, there is no job search requirement. The RMI pays about 1/2 the minimum wage; there are supplements for a couple (50%) and per child (30%). The insertion contract is between the individual and the “commission for insertion.” In theory, all recipients are entitled to an insertion contract, but work-based placements are limited. In 1994, only 70% of RMI recipients signed contracts. One-third were oriented towards “social autonomy” (health, daily living, etc.); one-third were jobs in the public and voluntary sectors, and one-third were looking for work. The degree of obligation is ambiguous with varying interpretations at the local level. Sanctions for refusing to take a job are few. Many RMI recipients are hard-to-employ.[133]

In 2000, the social partners who manage the unemployment system, introduced “PARE” (plan d’aide au retour a l’emploi) which is similar to the U.K. Job Seeker Agreement. This “activation” of the unemployment insurance proved to be very controversial, and at first was rejected by both the government and some unions. After some changes and considerable public debate, the system was enacted in 2001.[134]

The insertion programs increasingly target the young.[135] The young are more likely to work outside of the regular labor market in return for benefits. In France, this is considered “workfare.”[136] There are additional programs for the young – to improve vocational training, subsidizing private sector jobs and for apprentices, and jobs outside the private market (typically in caretaking and upkeep of community areas). About 250,000 full-time jobs have been created, two-thirds of which are apprentice contracts and assisted employment in the non-market sector. The training courses and the subsidized jobs have countered unemployment, at least in the short-term, for several hundred thousand young. Insertion, however, is problematic because of the growing lack of secure working conditions[137]

In theory, the French social protection and insertion policy is conditioned on reciprocal obligations. In practice, RMI has turned out to be a very loose form of constraint. There is a “right” to insertion, but, as stated, only about 7 out 10 participate. The policies are ambiguous in terms of objectives and implementation. Sanctions are rare either for adults or the young.[138] Employers are substituting subsidized placements rather than creating new jobs. Clients tend to move from placement to placement within the subsidized sector. The programs enhance traditional labor market selectivity -- the more skilled get into the better programs and get the better jobs. Lǿdemel and his colleagues believe that the programs nevertheless continue because they act as a “substitute” for the absence of social programs for the young. Since social assistance is not available, the social activation programs prevent the youth from falling into poverty.[139] French immigrants, especially from North Africa and the Middle East, including children who were born in France, suffer discrimination which further diminishes their chances for labor market success. A great many are confined to squalid housing estates and are greatly disadvantaged in the competitive education system.[140] In the meantime, there continues to be public confrontation over unemployment funds, health reform, and pension reform.[141] There are higher levels of unemployment, inequality and social exclusion. Public expenditures are now at an all-time high, but now, with the economy seemingly to begin a recovery, and with predictions of stronger growth, proposed austerity measures are even more resented.[142]

In Germany, reunification brought on a severe recession; by 1996, the unemployment rate was 10.3%.[143] The first response was to encourage retirement which proved to be very costly, and is slowly being restricted.[144] In the meantime, unions continue to defend real wages, costs continue to rise, and unemployment remains high.[145] Social assistance, financed and administered by the local authorities, is intended to cover basic needs. The amount varies with family size and it is considered to be a last resort safety net. There are two parts. One, “Assistance in Special Situations” is for the ill and disabled. The other, “Cost-of-Living Assistance” (COLA) is for people who lack sufficient income.[146] This later program contains a high proportion of single mothers and the long-term unemployed. There have been significant changes in the social assistance rolls with the growth of unemployment and the decline in skilled work. Social assistance has also increased with the growth in refugees and asylum-seekers. Within the unemployed, the social assistance recipients are the most poorly qualified. [147]

Changes have been made to make social assistance more “active.” There have been several reductions in benefits although benefits have increased for lone mothers who are acknowledged as reproductive workers.[148] There have been a series of increases in workfare. In part, this is due to the rising costs of social assistance for the local authorities and, in part, to provide a greater “work-testing” of the unemployed.[149] The public favors work in return for benefits. Germany, at least at the Federal Level, is now committed to active labor market policies. All employable recipients are in principle required to participate. Activation focuses on direct job placement in the low-wage sector; recipients are required to accept any job that is offered either through the unemployment office or the local authority social assistance office; benefits are to be cut if the recipient refuses to accept any job.[150] There are exceptions if the work is “overtaxing,” or endangers the future pursuit of a previous occupation, or endangers child-rearing.[151]

In the meantime, local authorities became increasingly reluctant to continue supporting social security claimants, especially the long-term unemployed.[152] They introduced a range of “activation” policies called “Help Towards Work” (HTW).[153] HTW creates two forms of work requirements. One is work under an employment contract which carries standard wages and is incorporated into the social insurance system. The other is more casual work that is not subject to an employment contract. In addition, local authorities may provide vocational training.[154] For the most employable, there are subsidized regular jobs with standard working conditions. These positions are limited to one year. However, if the worker is not hired permanently, he or she is eligible for unemployment benefits, and thus not a charge for the local authority. There are community jobs with reduced wages for those with more barriers to employment. In 2000, a law was passed to improve the cooperation between social assistance and unemployment administration, with one uniform activation system for both programs, with an emphasis on direct, quick job placement or a work program. There is pending legislation that mandates with the beginning of unemployment, an individual re-integration plan has to be entered into, and recipients have to meet their obligations or will face a complete cutoff from their benefits for at least 12 weeks.[155]

What few studies do exist report that there is considerable “creaming.” The more employable can more easily be placed in contract jobs, which are then covered by social insurance in case of unemployment instead of the local authority social assistance budget.[156] Until 1993, local authorities used their discretion not to impose sanctions; now they are required by Federal law to sanction after a threat by a social worker. It is reported that social workers sometimes refuse to issue a threat to avoid having to impose a sanction. At the present time, a majority of local authorities do not sanction[157] The long-term unemployed are concentrated in the 50 years and over group and have long work histories. It is easier to encourage exit than activation.[158] On the other hand, it seems that sanctions for social assistance recipients will increase. It is claimed that local authorities are not necessarily unwilling to sanction, but lack sufficient work and training opportunities. There is the strong commitment to activation at the federal level, and the federal government is increasing its monitoring and tightening national guidelines.[159]

Summary and Conclusions

In sum, there are mixed results. According to the Fafo Institute, in France, those with insertion contracts tend to be younger and better educated and only about 25% of recipients leave RMI for work. In the Norwegian compulsory programs, there were no positive effects in either employment or earnings.[160] In France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the U.K., those who were younger, better educated, and with fewer social problems, tended to benefit; thus, concludes the Fafo Institute, they would have been more likely to find jobs on their own. Norway, on the other hand, did serve people with less work experience and more problems.[161] In the Netherlands, the most disadvantaged seem to be worse off as a result of the programs. While overall satisfaction was generally high, a significant portion said that the programs were a waste of time[162]

Others report similar findings. While most target groups are positive about social inclusion programs, there remain many difficulties. The employment service offices have difficulty in sustaining a client-centered approach rather than an employment placement-centered approach.[163] Creaming seems to be widespread. Most programs to help the long-term unemployed have had modest effects on re-employment while offering employer windfalls. Positive outcomes sometimes contribute to new exclusions.[164] The most motivated and skilled workers disproportionately reap the benefits of subsidy and training programs. The EU White Paper expressed concern that, of the 10 million new jobs created during the 1980s, only 3 million were taken by those on unemployment registries. New labor force entrants rather than the socially excluded took the vast majority.[165] Workers who most need income protection -- part-timers, services, domestics, homeworkers, flexiworkers, the black or shadow economy, etc. are usually not affected by regulatory labor laws.[166] In all countries, the take-up rate for social assistance is well below 100%. Moreover, of those who do receive benefits, many remain in poverty because of lack of coverage, low benefits, and low take-up rates.[167]

Gender discrimination remains a serious issue throughout Western Europe. Pay differentials remain large.[168] Women continue to face discrimination in terms of the benefits and conditions in the standard labor contract. More women than men work part-time (32% vs. 5%), but with the exception of the Netherlands and Scandinavia, a high proportion of these women indicated that they would prefer to work full-time. The hourly wage rate for part-time is lower than full-time and has not led to a redistribution of family responsibilities.[169] There persists a significant amount of occupational segregation.[170]

A major issue in all countries involves immigrants – an issue which will continue to grow in importance. Immigr